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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15525

-vsDENNIS BLAINE ANGUS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with aggravated assault in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1975).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury on October S,
1977, in the District Court of Utah County, the Honorable
Allen B. Sorenson, presiding.

The jury returned a verdict

of guilty and the appellant was sentenced to a term not to
exceed five years on the aggravated assault

charge~

because

a firearm was used in the crime the court invoked the
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3)

(Supp. 1977), and
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imposed an additional sentence not to exceed five
years, to run consecutively with the first.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the verdict
and of the judgments of the court below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 20, 1977, Clyde Davies was driving a
truck southbound on I-15 near Santaquin, Utah, when a bullet
pierced the door on the driver's side and struck his leg
(T.9-11).

He saw a highway patrol car about 60 yards away,

stopped on the northbound berm; so Davies drove his truck to
a spot opposite, where he pulled over and stopped.

He then

walked across the lanes of traffic to the patrol car, where
he told Officer Mike Royce of the incident (T.17).
At about the same time Kent Child had a bullet
strike the door of his vehicle, and as he turned in the
direction of the shot, he saw a white van northbound (T.22).
Dan Davidson testified that as he drove southbound on I-15,
he heard a loud noise, like a tire blowing out, and observed
a cream-colored van passing northbound on the interestate,
adding that he saw no other traffic northbound in the
immediate vicinity (T.36).
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Mr. Child turned around, parked his car near the
patrol car, and told Officer Royce about the white van (T.25).
While Officer Royce took Mr. Davies to the hospital, Officers
Sparks and Bradford received information about the suspect
van and headed northbound in pursuit, stopping the appellant
within five minutes of the shooting report (T.81), in his
white van on the Payson off-ramp (T.41).

In court, Officer

Bradford identified appellant as the driver of the van (T.42).
The two officers ordered appellant from the van and
Officer Bradford proceeded to search him (T.42).

During the

body search, appellant asked what the problem was and Officer
Bradford told him he was in a suspect vehicle and that he
would like to look in the van.

Officer Bradford testified

that appellant then said: "Go ahead.

I will tell you anything

you want to know or tell you where anything is if you want to
know." (T.43).

Appellant also reportedly told the officer

that a .22 rifle and a .22 pistol were in there (T.43).
Officer Bradford entered the van and found a number
of empty .22 shells in the driver's seat, a box half-full of
ammunition on the console and more eMpty shells throughout
the van.

Just behind the passenger seat was a loaded .22 rifle

and against the rear doors was a .22 partially loaded pistol
(T.44).

-3-
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Officer Royce thereafter found a spent casing in
the northbound lanes near the Santaquin overpass (T.87),
Ballistics expert James Gaskill testified that
all of the recovered casings were fired from appellant's
.22 pistol, except for one fired from the rifle (T.105-107),
He reached no conclusions about the origin of the bullet
fragments taken from Mr. Davies' leg (T.106).
Appellant testified that he was "half-drunk" that
evening and if he shot his weapons on the highway it would
not have been intentional.

Earlier that day he had been

test-firing his guns (T.126).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A.

THE SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS CONDUCTEC,

PURSUANT TO APPELLANT'S CONSENT; THEREFORE, EVIDENCE OBTAINEC
DURING THE SEARCH WAS ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL.
The circumstances of the search of appellant's
vehicle demonstrate convincingly that appellant voluntarily
consented to the search of his van by Officer Bradford.
Pertinent testimony is documented at T.43, during the direct
examination of the officer, after earlier questioning had
established that Officer Bradford parked his vehicle behind
appellant's van, ordered appellant out of his vehicle, and
approached and searched appellant:

-4-
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"A. When I was searching
him he asked me what was going
on.
I told him he was in a
suspect vehicle; that we would
like to look in his van. He
said, 'Go ahead.
I will tell
you anything you want to know
or tell you where anything is if
you want to know.'
Q. Did he tell you what
was in the van?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. What did he say?
A. He said, 'There is a
.22 rifle in there and there is
a pistol, .22 pistol.'
Q. Did you in fact look
into the van?
A. Yes, I did."
Officer Bradford then continued to describe
the weapons and ammunition found inside the van.

It must

be emphasized that no objections to any of this testimony
were made at trial nor does the record indicate any
motion to suppress the evidence by defense counsel prior
to trial.

Thus, respondent contends that by failing to

raise such objections or motions to the admission of
the evidence found during the search, appellant waived
the right to raise such objections now on appeal.
Nevertheless, the record--in particular Officer
Bradford's testimony--provides no support for appellant's
claim that he merely consented to the authority of the
police to search and did not personally authorize the
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search.

Respondent submits that Bumper v. North Carolina,

391 U.S. 543 (1968), relied upon by appellant, is easily
distinguished for in Bumper the Court held no genuine
consent to a search can be given where the basis for
the consent is an assertion by a law enforcement officer
that he has a search warrant; therefore, the lawfulness
of the search cannot be justified on the basis that the
occupant consented.
Because appellant's consent was actual and not
coerced in any manner by the investigating officers, the
fruits of that search were properly admitted into evidence
at trial.
B.

AN ADDITIONAL BASIS FOR THE SEARCH WAS

PROVIDED BY THE PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP THE VAN IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH EXCEPTION
ALLOWED FOR MOVING VEHICLES.
Officer Royce testified (T.76) that after he
escorted Mr. Davies to the patrol car, he waved

Officer

Sparks northbound, anticipating the direction the suspect
vehicle had gone, based on an earlier report which had
alerted him of another incident.

The information provided

by Mr. Child described the suspect vehicle as a northbound
white van (T.40), one that Officer Sparks had observed
just prior to Mr. Davies' report.

The traffic that
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evening was light, and appellant's van was the only white
one in the vicinity (T.40).

Approximately four minutes

after the radio report to intercept a white van, Officer
Sparks and Bradford made contact with the van, followed
it for two miles (T.41), and pulled the van over on the
Payson off-ramp (T.77).
Even without appellant's consent, respondent
submits that the officer's search of the van and seizure
of the weapons and ammunition was a valid search and
seizure based on probable cause and justified by the
exigent circumstances presented by a moving vehicle.
The probable cause was established by the
particular enumerated facts--the description, the timing,
the traffic light--which led police officers reasonably
to believe that the shots had been fired from appellant's
white van.

The situation was critical; an unidentified

driver of a white van had been taking pot-shots at
passing vehicles, seriously endangering lives.

All

indications were that the shots had originated in appellant 1 s van.

To merely discuss the situation with appellant

was insufficient and to release the vehicle and driver
without a search unthinkable, as the high risk of
further injury to other innocent travelers would not
have been decreased if weapons remained in the van.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This Court discussed the tension between the
right of a citizen to be free from unwarranted governmental interference and the need of law enforcement
officers to perform their tasks conscientiously in State
v. Criscola, 444 P.2d 517 (Utah 1968), at p. 517:
" • • • But it is equally
important that such protections
do not become so extended beyond
their reasons for being that even
when there is no danger or likelihood of any such abuse, they provide
a cloak of protection by which those
engaged in criminal activities may
escape detection and punishment.
The essential thing is to keep
within the reasonable middle ground,
between the protecting of the lawabiding citizen from high-handed
or officious intrusions into their
private affairs; and the imposing of
undue restrictions upon conscientious
officers doing their duty in the
investigation of crime."
On this basis, given the officer's probable cause,
a search of the van was necessary.

Under Carroll v. United

States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970), the on-the-scene warrantless search which
ensued was legal:
"The measure of legality of
such a seizure is, therefore, that
the seizing officer shall have
reasonable or probable cause for
believing that the automobile which
he stops and seizes has contraband
liquor therein which is being
illegally transported." 267 u.s
at 155-156.
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1

In the instant case, the suspected contraband was a loaded
weapon, but the rationale is the same; as the Carroll Court
noted, the search of an automobile on probable cause proceeds
on a theory wholly different from that justifying a search
incident to an arrest for:
" • • • [t)he right to search and
the validity of the seizure are not
dependent on the right to arrest.
They are dependent on the reasonable
cause the seizing officer has that
the contents of the automobile
offend against the law." 267 U.S.
at 158-159.
It is well settled that once probable cause is
established to search a vehicle stopped on the highway, a
search warrant is unnecessary.

The Carroll Court observed

that the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and
the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant
must be obtained.

Seeing no difference between seizing

and holding a vehicle for a warrant and searching the
vehicle on the spot, the Court decided that given
probable cause, either course is reasonable.
The Chambers' decision reinforced the Carroll
principles, observing that the opportunity to search is
fleeting since a car is readily movable.

At 90 s.ct. 1981,

Footnote 9, the Court remarked:
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• . [f]ollowing the car
until a warrant can be obtained
seems an impractical alternative
since, among other things, the
car may be taken out of the
jurisdiction. Tracing the car
and searching it hours or days
later would of course permit the
instruments or fruits of crime to
be removed from the car before the
search."
Under this analysis, the highway patrol officers
had a right--if not a duty--to search the suspect van
for weapons, even if this Court were to find appellant's
consent to the search defective.
Since the plain view doctrine might also justify
this search (T.43), respondent urges that on any of these
three bases, this Court find the warrantless search valid
and the fruits therefrom admissible.
POINT II
THE ENHANCEMENT PROVISION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§

76-3-203 (SUPP. 1977), DOES NOT IMPOSE A DOUBLE

PUNISHMENT FORBIDDEN BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Pertinent portions of Section 76-3-203 provide:
"A person who has been convicted
of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows:

*(3)

*

*

In the case of a felony of the
third degree, for a term not to exceed
five years but if the trier of fact finds
a firearms or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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commission or furtherance of the
felony, the court may additionally
sentence the person convicted for
an indeterminate term not to exceed
five years to run consecutively and
not concurrently."
This statute grants the court the discretionary
power to impose on a felon a longer sentence if he used
a firearm during the commission of a crime.

In Utah and

numerous other states having such a provision, the statute
was the response of a legislature concerned with the
dramatic increase in violent crimes and especially in the
use of firearms to commit those crimes, greatly increasing
the risk of injury or death to the victims.

Respondent

contends that an enhancement provision is not a double
punishment; it is rather a punishment increased by the
court when a firearm is used, adopted both as a method
of deterring criminals from using these most deadly
weapons and of punishing them more severely than others
who commit the same crimes without using a firearm.
The cases cited by appellant on this point are
readily distinguished.

Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163,

21 L.Ed. 872 (1874), was a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, in which the petitioner complained that
although he was convicted under an embezzlement statute
which provided for imprisonment or fine as a punishment,
he was both sentenced to prison and ordered to pay a fine.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Court found this an illegal double punishment, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which states that "no person shall for
the same offense be twice put in jeopardy of life or

"

limb • • •

United States v. Elwell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966),
also mentions the Double Jeopardy clause in a case
concerning narcotics convictions and retrials after
reversals.

The Court found that clause designed to

prohibit double jeopardy as well as double punishment
and "is not properly invoked unless the 'same offense'
is involved in both the first and second trials."
at 124.

Id.

The instant case simply does not involve two

trials for one offense, but a lengthened sentence for
using a firearm during one crime.
The third case relied upon by appellant also
involved a retrial after the reversal of the first
conviction.

In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711

(1969), the Court held that while the Double Jeopardy
Clause is violated when punishment already exacted for
an offense is not fully credited in imposing a new
sentence after retrial on the same offense, the clause
does not restrict the length of sentence upon reconviction;
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and a more severe sentence may legally be imposed.
again,

it is the

Once

dissimilarities to the instant

case which are noteworthy--not the similarities--which
are limited to both cases being criminal, rather than
civil.
Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 21 L.Ed. 872
(1874), provided considerable historial analysis
of the Double Jeopardy Clause in observing the clear
intent of the framers to be that in the area of double
punishment that a man not be subject to a second punishment for the same offense for which he has already
served a separate punishment.

Since appellant was

sentenced to only one punishment, admittedly made
more severe because a firearm was used, respondent
submits that no violation of the double punishment
prohibition occurred.

-13-
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POINT III
APPELLAN'l' HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE UTAH
ENHANCEMENT STATUTE; THEREFORE ITS INVOCATION BY 'l'HE TRIAL
JUDGE WAS NOT A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.
Appellant complains that he was never specifically
informed of the existence of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-3-203 (Supp.

1977),or of its possible application in his case, claiming
that he may have plea bargained his way to a lesser penalty
or a lesser crime.

Not only is such mere speculation in-

appropriate here, but also a mistake of law is generally no
defense.

Utah Code Ann.

§

76-2-304

(Supp. 1977), provides in
t~

pertinent part that:"(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning

I'

existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime.,\
I

A few limited exceptions, inapplicable under these facts, au
then provided.

I

Therefore, appellant and his attorney were

on constructive notice of the statute's existence and a

br~f

perusal of the Sentencing provisions of the Code would have
easily detected the enhancement statute.

Therefore, appellan:,

who used a firearm during his crime, was on notice that if
convicted, § 76-3-203 might be applied.
By its language the enhancement statute is permissive, not mandatory.

Consequently, its application is

left to the discretion of the court, although it can act on~
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if a finding of firearm use has been made by the trier
of fact.

That is, of course, not determined until the

verdict is returned; so the court's deliberative process
begins after the conviction with a weighing of the facts
of the case which support imposition of the more severe
penalty and any mitigating facts which suggest that the
judicial discretion not to invoke the enhancement statute
ought to be exercised.
Therefore, there should have been no suprises at
sentencing when Judge Allen B. Sorenson announced his intention to invoke the enhancement statute and tack onto appellant's
initial 0-5 year sentence an additional 0-5 years, to run consecutively, for using a firearm to commit the aggravated
assault.

Respondent asserts that any actual surprise resulted

from appellant's own negligence in failing to study sentencing
options and provisions under the Utah Code before deciding to
plead not guilty.
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501 (1962),
cited by appellant, does not support his position as that case
concerned an habitual offender statute and the notice requirements applicable thereto.

In finding there was a denial of

due process, the Court said at 503-504:
"Even though an habitual criminal
charge does not state a separate offense,
the determination of whether one is a
habitual criminal is essentially independent
of the determination of guilt on the underlying substantive offense."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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However, in the instant case the decision whether or not the
enhancement provision could be invoked rested totally on the
findings of the jury that a firearm was used in this one
crime, a finding necessary under the facts before a guilty
verdict could be returned.

Respo~dent,

therefore, urges the

court to find that appellant was amply accorded due process
of the law.
POINT IV
THE RETURN OF A GENERAL GUILTY VERDICT IS A FINDING BY IMPLICATION THAT THE DEFENDANT USED A FIREARM, WHERE
THE INFORMATION ALLEGED THAT THE DEFENDANT USED A FIREARM
IN AN ATTEMPT TO DO BODILY INJURY.
The information against appellant excerpted below

I

and made part of the Appendix, clearly shows that he was charcj
with using a firearm to commit an assault:
" . . . charges that . . . Dennis Blaine
Angus assaulted Clyde Davies by attempting,
with unlawful force or violence, to do
bodily injury to the said Clyde Davies by
use of a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm."
All of the state's evidence at trial concerned

~oor

ing reports, bullet holes in vehicles and in a person, retrie':
of guns, ammunition, and bullet casings, and ballistic report;,
linking bullets with guns found in appellant's van.

The on~

aggravated assault at issue was the one alleged to have been
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committed by appellant by taking pot-shots at a passing
vehicle.

Instructions Four and Five, attached hereto as

part of the Appendix, informed the jury of the elements of
the charge with such specificity that a not guilty verdict
was mandatory unless the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt that appellant had used a firearm as the deadly weapon.
Although it is true that the jury did not return a
special finding to that effect, the return of the guilty
verdict was a finding by implication that appellant had committed the crime as charged; and that finding provided the
basis for the court's invocation of the enhancement provision
of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-3-203 (Supp. 1977).

State v. Aberigo, 109 Ariz. 294, 508 P.2d 1156 (1973),
supports this rationale and cited approvingly State v. Tosatto,
107 Ariz. 231, 485 P.2d 556 (1971).

In the latter case the

appellant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon.

The

Arizona enhancement provision was invoked even though there
had been no jury finding of use of a gun.

Commenting that

the evidence clearly showed that the defendant had pointed
a pistol at the victim, firing it so it barely missed her head,
the court held that "all that is necessary [to invoke an
enhanced punishment] is that the evidence presented clearly
indicates that the assault was committed by means of a gun."
485 P.2d 560.
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While the Arizona case is directly on point, the
California case cited by appellant is not.

The facts of

People v. Najera, 8 C.A. 3rd 504, 503 P.2d 1353 (1972), are
considerably different.

That defendant was charged with

robbery and with being armed with a deadly weapon.
secution failed to request jury instruction on the

The pro~

of a

firearm under Section 12022.5 of the California Penal Code.
The Court noted that an identical situation had arisen in
People v. Spencer, 22 Cal. App. 3d 786, 99 Cal Rptr. 681, 691
(1972), where the Second District Court of Appeals had

I

deni~

the People's request that the cause "be remanded to permit
the People the opportunity to try to a jury the allegation
that appellant 'used' a firearm within the meaning of Penal
Code Section 12022.5."

Approvingly citing Spencer at lengti,

the California Supreme Court in Najera held that the People
waived the application of Section 12022.5 by failing to ask
for instructions on use of a weapon, as a jury's findings
that a defendant is armed is not equivalent to a finding that
a defendant used his weapon.
As the Najera case is not analogous to the instant
case, respondent urges this Court to adopt the Arizona view
that the court may invoke the enchanced punishment provision
when the evidence clearly indicates that the convicted
defendant used a firearm during the crime.
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POINT V
UTAH CODE ANN.

§

76-3-203 (SUPP.

1977~

IS A

SENTENCING PROVISION ONLY AND DOES NOT CREATE A NEW OFFENSE.
The Utah Legislature inserted the enchancement
statute in the Punishments chapter of the Utah Code.

Although

appellant suggests that the legislature probably intended to
create a new offense, respondent submits that placement in
the Punishments chapter was more than fortuitous and that
had a new offense been intended it would logically have been
placed in one of the several Offenses chapters, especially
Offenses Against the Person.

Significantly, the legislature

elected to place the enhancement statute in the Sentencing
section of the Punishments chapter, indicating a clear intent
that it be a sentencing provision only, not a new offense.
Numerous other states have considered this issue and
have determined that no new crime is created.
ing states so finding:

Among neighbor-

Nevada [Raby v. Nevada, 574 P.2d 895

(1976)], California [People v. White, 129 Cal.Rptr. 769, 549
P.2d 537 (1946)], and New Mexico [State v. Barreras, 88 N.Mex
52, 536 P. 2d ll08

(1975)].

Respondent acknowledges that the federal enchanced
punishment provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) has been construed
as creating a separate offense that must be separately charged.
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However, the language of the federal statute is dissimilar
to the Utah statute,,and courts finding that a separate
federal offense was created have relied heavily on the
legislative history and wording of the Act.
For convenience of comparison, the United States
and Utah statutes are set out below:
" (c) Vi'hoever-(1) uses a firearm to commit any
felony for which he may be prosecuted
in a court of the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully
during the commission of any felony
for which he may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, shall in
addition to the punishment provided
for the commission of such felony,
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor
more than ten years.
In the case of
his second or subsequent conviction
under this subsection, such person
shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for not less than two
nor more than twenty-five years and,
notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the court shall not suspend
the sentence in the case of a second
or subsequent conviction of such
person or give him a probationary
sentence, nor shall the term of
imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any
term of imprisonment imposed for the
commission of such felony." 18 U.S.C.
§ 924 (c) (emphasis added).
"Felony conviction--Indeterminate
term of imprisonment--Increase of
sentence if firearm used.--A person
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who has been convicted of a felony
may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as follows:
(1)
In the case of a felony of
the first degree, for a ter~ at not
less than five years and which may be
for life but if the trier of fact finds
a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the
commission or furtherance of the felony,
the court shall additionally sentence
the person convicted for a term of one
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally
sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five
years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(2)
In the case of a felony of
the second degree.
(3)
In the case of a felony of
the third degree.

(4) Any person who has been sentenced
to a term of imprisonment for a felony in
which a firearm was used or involved in the
accomplishment of the felony and is convicted of another felony when a firearm
was used or involved in the accomplishment
of the felony shall, in addition to any
other sentence imposed, be sentenced for
an indeterminate term to be not less than
five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not concurrently." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (in part).
After a lengthy analysis of the statute's legislative history, the court in United States v. Suddeth, 457
F.2d 1198, 1201 (10th Cir. 1972), concluded that a separate
crime had been intended by Congress and made these pertinent
observations:
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"If the subsection 924(c)
is considered as a separate Act
taken out of the context in which
it was placed, it takes on the
appearance of an ordinary provision defining a crime. As the
wording is typical of such a
definition, it is perhaps unusual
to take such a subsection out of
context, but we think it should
be done because it is in fact a
stranger where it is placed.
It
is apparent also that the language
in the subsection making the crime
dependent upon the proof of another crime is unusual, but again
it does not necessarily convert
it into merely an increase in
the penalty for the basic crime.
This aspect does not overcome the
other indications of the construction of the subsection as an
independent crime.
Perhaps the strongest single
phrase in the subsection to indicate it is a separate crime is
the reference to '.
.subsequent
convictions under this subsection
This, of course, is typical
of a definition of a separate
crime and provisions relating to
the increase in punishment upon
the second or third conviction
thereof."
While it was therefore reasonable and proper to
hold that 18 U.S.C. §924(c) created a separate federal cri~,
respondent submits that the language and placement of the
Utah statute just as clearly leads to a conclusion that §763-203 is a punishment provision only, which allows a court to
impose a more severe sentence on a convicted felon who used
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a firearm during the commission of the crime, as a recognition of the great, immediate potential for serious bodily
harm that is unique to firearms and which set guns apart
from knives, chains, or baseball bats.
CONCLUSION
Because the guns and ammunition were legally seized
following appellant's consent to the search and/or under the
moving vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, and Utah
Code Ann.

§

legislative

76-3-203 (Supp. 1977),is a valid exercise of
po1~r

to punish more severely persons who use

firearms to commit felonies, respondent urges this Court to
affirm the verdict and judgment of the court below.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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Instruction No. 4
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah
against the defendant

i~ ~hich

of the conunission of a felony.

he is accused by the information
The charging part of the

information is as follows:
"That on or about the 2Qth day of July A.D., 1977, at
Utah county, State of Utah, the said

Denni~

Blaine Angus

assaulted Clyde Davies by attempting, with unlawful force or
violence, to do bodily injury to the said Clyqe_Davies by use
of a deadly weapon, to-wit:

a firearm."

When the defendant was arraigned upon this charge he
entered a plea of not guilty, which ?lea casts upon the State
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the essential
elements of the crime charged as set forth in Instruction No. 5.
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Instruction No. 5
The essential elements of the crime charged in the
information are as follows:
1.

That the defendant made an aggravated assault upon

the person of Clyde Davies.
2.

That such assault, if any, was made with a deadly

weapon in the hand of the defendant.
3.

That such assault, if any, was made or or about

July 20, 1977, at Utah County, Utah.
If the evidence has failed to prove to your satisfaction
beyond a reasonable doubt any of the essential elements set
forth above, then the defendant is not guilty of the crime
charged.

But if the evidence does prove to your satisfaction

beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of the essential elements
set forth above, then the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged.
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